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SECTION 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT: THE UNRESOLVED
DILEUMIA OF PARTICIPATING UNDERWRITERS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the few short years since Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.1 and
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.2 there has been a flood of commentary
on section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,3 but surprisingly little judicial guid-
ance. Aside from procedural questions, there has been only one adjudicated
case in the area: Felt v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.4 There have
been some recent developments in the area which indicate that the Securities
and Exchange Commission intends to be more active in the field of registration
statements, especially with regard to investment bankers and their counsel.'
This comment will attempt to explore the effects of section 11 liability on one
of the host of potential defendants, the participating underwriter.9
1. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). For an interpretation of the Securities Act of 1933 soon after
it was enacted see Douglas & Bates, Some Effects of the Securities Act Upon Investment
Banking, 1 U. Chi L. Rev. 283 (1933); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of
1933, 43 Yale LJ. 171 (1933); Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale LJ.
227 (1933). For a review of registration statement liability in light of recent decisions see Folk,
Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case (pts. I & 2), 55 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 199 (1969) [hereinafter cited by part as Folk]; Sympoium-"The BarChris Case:
Prospectus Liability," 24 Bus. Law. 523 (1969); Wvant & Smith, BarChris: A Revaluation
of Prospectus Liability?, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 122 (1968); Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence
Refined, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1411 (1968); Comment, The Expanding Liability of Securities
Underwriters: From BarChris to Globus, 1969 Duke LJ. 1191; Note, Escott v. BarChris:
"Reasonable Investigation" and Prospectus Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 908 (1969); Comment, BarChris: Easing the Burden of "Due
Diligence" Under Section 11, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 735 (1969).
4. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). This does not mean that plaintiffs are not availing
themselves of section 11 remedies. There has been a spate of cases since 1968 dealing with the
procedural problems involved in bringing such a suit. See, e.g., Miller v. Mackey Intl, Inc.,
452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971) (remanding district court's denial of class action); Hohmann
v. Packard Instr. Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968) (allowing plaintiffs to maintain a class
action); Dijulio v. Digicon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 963 (D. Md. 1971) (upholding service of
process on a participating underwriter); Rosenfield v. Integrated Container Serv. Indus.
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (allowing plaintiffs to maintain a class action); Weiss
v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (amended complaint required to determine
propriety of continuing as a class action).
5. See Wall Street J., Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1. The article noted that the Securities and
Exchange Commission has recently filed a series of actions "designed to bring lawyers,
accountants and bankers within the framework of securities regulations traditionally aimed
at stock traders, brokers and publicly held companies. In the past two years, the commisson
has brought probably a dozen cases aimed at least partly at forcing those professions, in
representing their individual clients in securities matters, to consider the interests of public
investors." Id.
6. See text accompanying notes 16-20 infra for a listing of potential defendants under
section 11.
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The 1933 Act was enacted to correct abuses existing in the securities industry
by requiring participants in a public offering of securities to disclose all relevant
facts, thereby putting the investing public on an equal footing with the seller
in the purchase of its securities.7 Thus, one must explore the role of the par-
ticipating underwriter in fulfilling this obligation in order to evaluate his
potential liability under section 11. It is inadequate and unrealistic to be satis-
fied with the proposition that both lead and participating underwriters have
identical obligations under this section.8 Furthermore, such a view would seem
to be contrary to the purposes of the Act.9 One commentator has noted that if
lead and participating underwriters had similar investigatory duties "chaos
would prevail . . . . The underwriters would spend all of their time writing
inquiries, posing questions, holding diligence meetings and generally doing
everything but trying to market securities. . . . [I]t would be a costly and
usually pointless duplication of the efforts which the lead underwriter should
undertake."'1 As the law stands, however, the participating underwriter must
either duplicate the efforts of the lead underwriter or rely on the lead under-
writer's investigation and risk being held liable on his account, regardless of
the participating underwriter's fault or connection with the source of the li-
ability.
One factor which has softened much of the impact of section 11 liability for
the underwriter is indemnity by the issuer. While there has been a decision
voiding an indemnity agreement,11 it was limited in scope.12 Nonetheless, it
may have sounded the death knell for this type of protection.'8 With regard
to this issue, as with the basic issue of liability, the question arises whether
the courts should distinguish between lead and participating underwriters.
II. SECTION 11
One of the primary concerns of investment bankers is the liability imposed
by section 1114 for the faulty preparation of a registration statement. This
7. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933); accord, Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,
139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43
Yale LJ. 171, 171-73 (1933); Folk (pt. 1) 17; Landis, The Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29, 34-35 (1959).
8. This is apparently where the law stands today as a result of Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, See text accompanying note 134 Infra.
10. Folk (pt. 1) 57.
11. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970).
12. Id. at 1288; see note 186 infra and accompanying text.
13. Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance
in Light of BarChris and Globus, Symposium---'The BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability,"
24 Bus. Law. 681, 692 (1969).
14. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). It is important to note at the
outset that proof of fraud or deceit is not necessary under section 11. Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951). There is also potential liability for the under-
writer in section 12, which prohibits the use of false or misleading statements in the pros-
870 [Vol. 40
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section provides that if a registration statement containing an untrue material
fact or omitting a material fact which would make it misleading becomes effec-
tive, any person acquiring a security marketed under such registration state-
ment may bring an action based on such misrepresentation unless it is shown
that he had knowledge of the untruth or omission. 5 The person acquiring the
security can bring the action against every signer of the registration state-
ment,"' every director, 17 every person named as a director in the registration
statement,' 8 every expert (including accountants, engineers or appraisers) ,9
and "every underwriter with respect to such security."2 0
pectus. Section 12 provides that anyone who sells or makes an offer to sell a security by
means of interstate commerce "by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which in-
dudes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the e.xercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing
such security from him . ." Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
The use of this section is somewhat limited because of its privity requirements. In most cases
the prospectus will be filed as part of a registration statement; therefore, a misrepresenta-
tion in the former will create section 11 liability, which does not contain privity require-
ments. Folk (pt. 2) 201-16.
15. "In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact re-
quired to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any
person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he
knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction, sue .... " Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. 77k(a) (1970). The
Securities and Exchange Commission has defined the term "material" within the context of
section 11 as follows: "The term 'material,' when used to qualify a requirement for the
furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those mat-
ters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before pur-
chasing the security registered." 17 C.FY_ § 230.405(1) (1971). One court, in interpreting
materiality within the confines of section 11, has held "that a fact is proved to be material
when it is more probable than not that a significant number of traders would have wanted
to know it before deciding to deal in the security at the time and price in question." Felt v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp, 332 F. Supp. 544, 571 "(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
16. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)(1), 15 U..C. § 77k(a)(1) (1970).
17. Id. § 11(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(2) (1970). This section covers every person who
was a director at the time of the filing of the registration statement.
18. Id. § 11(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(3) (1970).
19. Id. § 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1970).
20. Id. § 11(a) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (5) (1970). The Act defines "underwriter" to mean
"any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct
or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in
the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term shal not include
a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in
excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this para-
graph the term 'issuer' shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly
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Section 11 also enumerates the defenses to such an action. The first, which
is available to all defendants, applies where the purchaser has acquired the
security after the issuer has produced an earnings statement for a twelve
month period after the offending registration statement has become effective.
In such a case the claim for relief "shall be conditioned on proof that such
person acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the regis-
tration statement or relying upon the registration statement and not knowing
of such omission .... 21 It is somewhat anomalous, however, that the ag-
grieved security holder need not prove that he actually read the registration
statement.
22
Subsection (b) of section 11 establishes three defenses available to persons
other than the issuer. The first of these applies to persons who withdraw from
the registration process and so inform the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.P The second protects persons who are not aware that the registration
statement has become effective and who, being informed of this, notify the
Commission of their withdrawal and give reasonable public notice of this
lack of knowledge.24
The third defense in subsection (b) is by far the most important for the
underwriter and is commonly referred to as the "due diligence"20 defense.
This defense allows a party to show that, in regard to portions of the regis-
tration statement that were not included on the authority of an expert,20 it
had, after a reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did
believe that the registration statement contained no untrue material fact
nor omitted material facts which would make it misleading.27 A similar test
controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common
control with the issuer." Id. § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
21. Id. § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 11(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(1) (1970).
24. Id. § 11(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(2) (1970).
25. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. The following are named as experts under section 11: "[Ejvery accountant, engineer,
or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him,
who has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the regis-
tration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report for valuation which is used
in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registra-
tion statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified by
him .... " Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1970). Underwriters
are not considered to be experts. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); see Folk (pt. 1) 52.
27. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b) (3) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A) (1970). The statute
provides: "[A]s regards any part of the registration statement not purporting to be made on
the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or
valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be made on the authority of a public official
document or statement, he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe
and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact re-
quired to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead-
ing .... " Id.
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obtains with regard to experts and the material they supply.28 Where the
allegedly false or misleading material was supplied by an expert to either a
non-expert or another expert, the party must demonstrate that he had no
reasonable ground to believe and did not believe that the registration state-
ment contained untrue material facts or omitted material facts tending to
make it misleading.29 Expert defendants may also show that the material sup-
plied by them was not accurately presented by the issuer in the registration
statement.3O
Subsection (c) provides that in determining "what constitutes reasonable
investigation and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness
shall be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property."3 1
Regarding damages, section 11 limits the underwriter's liability to the ex-
tent to which he has participated in the issue provided, however, he did not
receive any special consideration from the issuer.a2 There is also a limit on the
total liability for all defendants, which is the total price of the issue as offered
to the public.P Finally, in cases where several defendants are held liable, sec-
tion 11 requires contribution, unless the party seeking contribution was guilty
of actual fraud.3V 4
Thus, section 11 creates civil liability through the enforcement of private
rights of action against those persons who have thwarted the overall goal of
the Securities Act of 1933 by failing to make such disclosure to investors as
to place them on an equal footing with the sellers of securities33 Upon its
28. Id. § 11(b)(3)(B), 1S U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (1970).
29. Id. § 11(b)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (1970); see Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d
208, 209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
30. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b) (3) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (C) (1970). Section 11
protects those underwriters who enter the transaction after the effective date of the regis-
tration statement. Id. § 11(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(d) (1970).
31. Id. § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1970).
32. Id. § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970). Subsection (e) also provides that damages
shall be, basically, the difference between the price paid for the security by the public and
the price of the security at the time the suit was filed. Regarding underwriters, the subsec-
tion provides: "In no event shall any underwriter (unless such underwriter shall have know-
ingly received from the issuer for acting as an underwriter some benefit, directly or indi-
rectly, in which all other underwriters similarly situated did not share in proportion to their
respective interests in the underwriting) be liable in any suit or as a consequence of suits
authorized under subsection (a) of this section for damages in excess of the total price at
which the securities underwritten by him and distributed to the public were offered to the
public." Id.
33. Id.; see Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967) (limiting benefits of a
settlement of a section 11 action to those persons who could establish that they purchased
securities issued under the registration statement); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951).
34. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970). See note 196 infra and ac-
companying text. For a case requiring contribution see Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv.
Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971).
35. Folk (pt. 1) 9.
1972]
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enactment, section 11, and especially the due diligence requirement, caused
much consternation among the investment community and led some to con-
clude that it signaled the demise of investment banking and commercial
financings 6 These fears proved groundless. Professor Loss has noted that
through mid-1969 he could find only thirty reported adjudications under sec-
tion 11, an average of less than one per year.ar This lack of cases has been
attributed both to the care taken by those concerned with the preparation of
registration statements and to the meticulous review given these financial
tracts by the Securities and Exchange Commission. "Nothing else," according
to Loss, "can account for the fact that more than 30,000 registration state-
ments have resulted in only two adjudicated recoveries under § 11, none since
1939, together with six reported decisions approving settlements of class ac-
tions since 1963."'38 However, recent developments have complicated this
area of the law, and indicate the necessity of a review of this section with
particular regard to the liability it imposes on participating underwriters.
II. THE Rorx or TH PARTICIPATmG UNDER RiTER In Tim REGISTRATION
OF SEcuRiTIEs UNDER TaE SEcmiRiTs ACT OF 1933
There are four basic forms of underwriting, and the underwriter's obligation
to the issuer varies with each. In "best efforts" underwriting, the underwriter
acts as a retailer in that he agrees to use his best efforts to sell the issue,
but makes no commitment to buy the unsold portion.9 In an "all or nothing"
underwriting, the underwriter agrees to sell the entire issue or, if he fails, to
return any funds received from the sale and cancel the underwriting.40
Oftentimes both of these types are combined, so that a "best efforts" under-
writing will contain an "all or nothing" provision.4 ' "Strict" or "stand-by"
36. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1721 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited by volume as
Loss]. The investment community was apparently upset when the bill was being drafted.
See Landis, supra note 7, at 39-40.
37. 6 Loss 3820 (Supp. 1969). For a review of some of the larger settlements under sec-
tion 11 see, e.g., Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ($1,825,000);
Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (approximately $2,200,000);
Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1963) ($5,300,000).
38. 6 Loss 3826 (Supp. 1969). Professor Loss also cites the expense of litigation, the re-
luctance to throw good money after bad, the inability to uncover facts and a general apathy
combined with the short period in the statute of limitations. 3 id. at 1692.
39. The "best efforts" underwriting is usually "considered the weakest underwriting tech-
nique and is generally only acceptable to an issuing corporation which has insufficient bar-
gaining power to obtain any other type of underwriting." G. Robinson & K. Eppler, Go-
ing Public § 22, at 95 (2d ed. 1972). [hereinafter cited as Robinson & Eppler). Professor
Loss notes that "[paradoxically, this type of distribution is also preferred on occasion by
companies which are so well established that they can do without any underwriting com-
mitment, thus saving on cost of distribution." 1 Loss 171.
40. "This form of underwriting carries the obvious risk of resulting in no public issue
and, in recent years, has hardly been used at all." Robinson & Eppler § 22, at 95.
41. This combination is common today and may be required under blue sky laws in cer-
tain states. Id.
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underwriting is the type most commonly used today in conjunction with a
rights offering where the issue is subject to the pre-emptive rights of the
issuing corporation's own shareholders. In this case the underwriters enter
into a "stand-by agreement" to purchase securities not purchased by the cor-
poration's shareholders.4 The final method is "firm commitment" under-
writing. Here the underwriter simply acts as a wholesaler and agrees to pur-
chase the entire issue. Aside from rights offerings, this is the most prevalent
type of underwriting, especially in the case of larger issues.44 Therefore, in
discussing the role of the participating underwriter, it will be presumed that
the transaction involves "firm commitment" underwriting.45
Companies desiring to make a public offering of securities usually contact
an underwriter either directly or through a finder.40 The choice of underwriter
is usually limited by the type of industry in which the issuer is engaged, his
reputation in the financial community, and the size of the issue.47 The selec-
tion is extremely important for both parties, not only because of the potential
liability under section 11, but also because the reputation of both will be
affected by the quality of the issue. It is obvious that an underwriter must sell
securities to stay in business, but his ability to sell depends largely upon his
reputation for underwriting issues which bring his customers profits 8 Thus
the underwriter has strong motivation, completely independent of liability
under section 11, to conduct a thorough and accurate investigation of the
issuer. This fact also gives added importance to the underwriter's role in the
42. 1 Loss 161.
43. Id. "Of the $3 billion of common stock issues registered with the SEC ... in the three
years 1951, 1953 and 1959 and offered through investment bankers, 59 percent were 'rights
offerings.' Usually stockholders are thus given a prior opportunity to purchase at a price
below the market. If the discount is sufficiently large, and especially if the issuer is well
established, the services of investment bankers may be dispensed with entirely. But it is
common practice for the issuer to enter into a 'stand-by agreement' with an investment
banker.' Id. (footnotes omitted).
44. Id. at 163-64.
45. For an excellent history and explanation of the investment banking system see United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The case involved an anti-trust action
brought against seventeen prominent investment banking houses. Judge Medina traced the
history of investment banking and then, after visiting one of the defendant firms, detailed
the functions of an investment banker. Id. at 635-55. There are several books which explain
the mechanics of underwriting. See, e.g., Going Public: Filing Problems (A. Levenson ed.
1970); Robinson & Eppler, supra note 39; When Corporations Go Public (C. Israes & G.
Duff eds. 1962) [hereinafter cited as When Corporations Go Public]. The Practicing Law In-
stitute also publishes material in conjunction with its lectures in this field. See, eg., Going
Public: Recent Registration Statement Developments (A. Levenson ed. 1969); 2d Annual
How to Go Public Institute (S. Friedman & D. Schwartz eds. 1971). See also 1 Loss
159-78.
46. A finder is an independent intermediary who serves to bring issuers and underwriters
together. Robinson & Eppler § 23, at 96-97.
47. Going Public: Recent Registration Statement Developments, supra note 45, at 66.
48. Robinson & Eppler § 25, at 102.
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preparation of the registration statement.40 It has been noted that "[w]hile
investors theoretically are supposed to rely on the prospectus to make their
evaluation of the investment merits of an issue, many investors, as a matter
of fact, regard the character of the underwriter as indicative of the character
of the issue.1''r
The next step in the underwriting involves negotiations between the com-
pany and the underwriter.r' During these negotiations, the underwriter gen-
erally conducts an investigation of the company by checking its annual reports
and former prospectuses and consulting the banks with which the company
has dealt.52 The underwriter will also analyze the prospects for the particular
industry as a whole.ra The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to
decide whether or not the underwriting should proceed.54 After the parties
have agreed on the terms of the underwriting and any steps the company must
take to facilitate it, the underwriter prepares a "letter of intent"5 setting
forth the basic terms which the parties intend to incorporate into the final
underwriting contract.
In the typical "firm commitment" underwriting, the underwriter with whom
the company has dealt will generally want to, and in many cases be required
to, spread the risk among other underwriters.50 This risk dispersal creates a
second level in the underwriting transaction. The first transaction involves
the agreement between the underwriter and the company" while the second
49. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696-97 (SJ.fN.Y. 1968).
50. Robinson & Eppler § 21, at 94.
51. The negotiations initially cover such items as the price of the issue and the under-
writer's compensation, which usually takes the form of a "spread." The spread is the dif-
ference between the price the underwriter pays for the security and the price at which It is
offered to the public. The amount of the spread will depend upon the quality of the issue;
speculative stock can have a spread approaching thirty percent. When Corporations Go Pub-
lic 65.
52. Robinson & Eppler § 13, at 52-53.
53. Id.
54. This investigation, as opposed to those conducted during the preparation of the reg-
istration statement, is carried on for business reasons. The latter investigation will usually be
concerned with the accuracy of the registration statement. Id.
55. "While such a letter of intent does not constitute a binding obligation on the part
of the underwriter to complete the underwriting, it is generally regarded as a satisfactory
indication that the expense of preparation of the issue is warranted. Conscious of their repu-
tations, most underwriters would only fail to carry out its terms in extreme cases." Id, § 14,
at 55. For a sample "letter of intent" see id. § 15, at 57; When Corporations Go Public 306.
56. SEC Rule 15c3-1 (a) (1), promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
provides that an underwriter can not allow his indebtedness to exceed 2,000 percent of his
capital. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1) (1971). This limitation can affect the quantity of issues
that can be underwritten. The underwriter may also desire to spread his risk because of po-
tential liability under Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), and the limits on
it provided by id. § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970). See United States v. Morgan, 118 F.
Supp. 621, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); When Corporations Go Public 84-86.
57. The agreement between the issuer and the lead underwriter is referred to hereinafter
as the "underwriting contract." For a sample underwriting contract see When Corporations
Go Public 272.
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involves the relationship between the underwriter and other investment bankers
regarding the formation of the underwriting syndicate.58 The underwriter
dealing with the issuer usually assumes the role of managing or principal un-
derwriter, and he is normally referred to as the representative.O" Those under-
writers invited by the representative to purchase portions of the offering are
referred to as participating underwriters. The participating underwriters
compensate the representative in the form of a management fee.c"
Both the managing and participating underwriters may be held to the same
standards of liability under section 11.' Due to this potential liability the
contractual relationship of the issuer to the underwriters is several rather than
joint, thereby making each underwriter responsible only for his percentage
of the issue. 2 Nonetheless, it is quite common for only the representative to
carry on a detailed investigation of the company in preparing the registration
statement, while the participating underwriters' contact with the company is
usually far less extensive. One commentator has noted that although "[e]ach
underwriter makes a separate, severable and unique commitment with the
company... the company's president may not even know the name of one
person in any of these [participating] underwriting houses . . . ?,0 Thus,
while the traditional underwriting is in the legal form of a group of invest-
ment bankers individually distributing the issue, the only underwriter who
participates in the compiling of information required to be disclosed by the
securities laws is the representative. The participating underwriters usually
consent to having the representative act on behalf of the group and give him
authority to sign the registration statement for them.
The participating underwriter, however, is not completely without knowl-
edge of the facts contained in the registration statement. The representative
and the company usually draw up a preliminary prospectus -which they are
allowed to distribute to participating underwriters. The Commission encourages
58. The agreement between the lead and participating underwriters is referred to here-
inafter as the "agreement among underwriters." For a sample agreement among underwriters
see Robinson & Eppler § 36, at 149.
59. 1 Loss 164. It is also possible that more than one investment banker will manage an
offering and therefore the issue could be managed by several representatives. Id. at 169.
Hereinafter, the terms representative and lead underwriter are used interchangeably.
60. Robinson & Eppler § 34, at 147. The management fee is usually based on the per-
centage of the issue purchased and is computed in cents per share. Id.
61. Section 11(a)(5) of the Securities Act of 1933 establishes liability without dis-
tinguishing between lead or participating underwriters. 15 US.C. § 77k(a) (5) (1970); see
note 143 infra and accompanying text.
62. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970). "Witness the fact that
underwriters still frequently take title jointly, or jointly and severally, when the security
is a municipal issue or some other type which is exempted from registration under the Se-
curities Act." 1 Loss 167 n.15.
63. Going Public: Recent Registration Statement Developments, supm note 45, at 72.
64. The agreement among underwriters usually provides that the lead underwriter shall
act as representative for the syndicate. Robinson & Eppler § 36, at 150; see Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 692-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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distribution of such a prospectus 5 to underwriters and dealers, and generally will
not declare a registration statement effective unless this preliminary prospectus
has been made "conveniently available to underwriters and dealers who it is rea-
sonably anticipated will be invited to participate in the distribution of the se-
curity to be offered or sold."00 This preliminary ("red herring") prospectus
contains most of the information that will appear in the final prospectus, with
the exception of basic underwriting data.67 The red herring prospectus serves a
dual purpose for the participating underwriters. It is used by them to guage the
interest of their customers in the issue before the effective date of the registra-
tion statement, thereby helping them to decide how they will price the issue.08
This preliminary prospectus is also the focal point of the "due diligence"
meeting. 9
A few days before the public sale takes place, the company and the under-
writers hold a "due diligence" meeting. The meeting is attended by the com-
pany, the principal underwriter, the independent auditor, and the participating
underwriters. Its purpose is to allow the participating underwriters to question
the company, the representative, and the accountant in order to determine
whether any of the information in the registration statement is misleading and
whether it is sufficient to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the securities
acts.70 In playing this essentially passive role, the participating underwriter has
a very limited impact on the contents of the prospectus and registration state-
ment.
71
To complete the transaction the representative signs the underwriting con-
tract and thereby binds himself and the participating underwriters to pur-
chase the issue. This is usually done on the date that the registration statement
is to become effective. Shortly thereafter, the underwriters, lead and partici-
pating, perform their functions as wholesalers or retailers of the public offering.
IV. Du DILIGENCE
The underwriter's proof that "he had, after reasonable investigation, rea-
sonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time . . . the registration
statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and that
there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading .. "2 is, as pre-
65. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (1971).
66. Id. § 230.460(a).
67. Robinson & Eppler § 39, at 159-60.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 160-62.
70. Id.; When Corporations Go Public 156.
71. The courts, in determining the exercise of due diligence, have stressed the necessity
for independent verification of the information supplied by the issuer, as opposed to cross
examination of the participants supplying the information. It is therefore difficult to imagine
a "due diligence" meeting satisfying the requirements of reasonable investigation required
by section 11. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 582
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
72. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b) (3) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A) (1970).
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viously noted,73 a defense to an action brought under section 11. The statute
further provides that "[i]n determining . . . what constitutes reasonable in-
vestigation and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness
shall be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own prop-
erty."74 This defense is commonly referred to as the "due diligence" defense,
and the person pleading it is required to "sustain the burden of [its]
proof . . .. 75
To understand this defense and its application to a participating underwriter,
it is again necessary to focus on the roles the various participants play in the
preparation of the registration statement. As previously indicated,78 the par-
ticipating underwriter does not play an active role and usually delegates the
responsibility to investigate to the representative in the agreement among
underwriters 7 The first phase of the representative's investigation usually
consists of checking the legality and regularity of all corporate proceedings,
including a check of the minutes of directors' meetings, the legality of prior
stock offerings, the possibility of restrictions on the present issue contained
in the charter, by-laws, loan agreements or contracts, the election of directors,
and any other corporate act which may affect the legality of the offering
under state or federal securities laws.78 The next phase consists of an exten-
sive and detailed examination of the issuer in regard to its business activities
and the data it intends to include in the registration statement. 70 The role
the underwriter plays in this investigation, especially the second phase, is
extremely critical. A recent decision noted that
[t]he courts must be particularly scrupulous in examining the conduct of underwriters
since they are supposed to assume an opposing posture with respect to management.
The average investor probably assumes that some issuers will lie, but he probably has
somewhat more confidence in the average level of morality of an underwriter who has
established a reputation for fair dealing.8e
It can be questioned, therefore, whether mere participation in a due diligence
meeting would satisfy the requirements of section 11, especially in light of evi-
dence that this meeting is an ineffective deterrent to misrepresentations in the
registration statement.8 '
73. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
74. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(c), 15 US.C. § 77k(c) (1970).
75. Id. § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
76. See notes 56-64 supra and accompanying text.
77. Oftentimes the delegation of responsibility is so complete that the lead underwriter
has authority to sign the underwriting contract for the syndicate and thereby legally bind
its members to purchase the issue. Robinson & Eppler § 36, at 150-51.
78. Going Public: Recent Registration Statement Developments, supra note 45, at 70-71.
79. Id.
80. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
81. Going Public: Filing Problems, supra note 45, at 324-25. See text accompanying
notes 65-69 supra.
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A. Judicial Development of Due Diligence
Due to the relative paucity of cases on section 11 liability, the courts have
had little chance to lay down guidelines for the defense of due diligence. There
have been a few decisions, however, and they provide the only indication we
have of how the courts will view the due diligence question. In re Charles E.
Bailey & Co.82 involved the revocation of a broker-dealer registration before
the Securities and Exchange Commission. The underwriter knew that the
issuer was "in bad shape" and that the issuer "was embarking on a new and
untried business" which, if not successful, would cause the proceeds of the
issue to be "quickly consumed by overhead expenses.18s3 The Commission
held that since the new enterprise was already experiencing difficulty, the
underwriter could not simply rely on information furnished to him by the
issuer.8 4 This reliance did not constitute the exercise of reasonable investiga-
tion required as a defense to this action.8 5 The Commission noted that in a
case such as this one "the underwriter must be particularly careful in veri-
fying the issuer's obviously self-serving statements as to its operations and
prospects."80
In re Richmond Corp.87 involved the issuance of a stop order suspending
the effectiveness of a registration statement. One of the reasons cited for the
order was the registration statement's failure to disclose the limited experience
of the underwriter.88 The issuer was in the real estate business and was going
to develop certain unimproved lands into residential lots and shopping centers.
The deal was replete with speculation, undisclosed competition and conflicts of
interest. The Commission found that the underwriter's visiting two of the
three tracts of land owned by the issuer, examining stockholder lists, and
obtaining credit reports on the registrant, and thereafter relying on repre-
sentations of the registrant regarding the rest of the material in the registra-
tion statement, did not amount to a reasonable investigation within the
82. 35 SE.C. 33 (1953).
83. Id. at 41-42.
84. Id. The transaction involved was a "best efforts" underwriting. The corporation was
seeking funds to develop the automatic production of bicycle chains. The management was
of the opinion that it could produce 1,000 chains per day but it had never been able to
produce more than 400 chains per day. Id. at 36. The management also overstated orders
and was misleading in its description of the market potential for chains. Id. at 36-37. The
Commission stated that the underwriter owed a duty to the investing public "to assure the
substantial accuracy of representations made in the prospectus .... " Id. at 41.
85. Id at 42.
86. Id. The underwriter had seen the machine used for production break down. He had
also seen the dated orders referred to in the prospectus and knew that those orders still
effective were only a fraction of the amount stated in the prospectus. Id.
87. 41 S.E.C. 398 (1963).
88. The managing underwriter's only previous experience was the fact that he had become
a broker-dealer earlier in the year. The firm's only experience was in connection with two
prior offerings. "One of these offerings was deregistered . . . . In the other offering, made
pursuant to a claimed exemption from registration under Regulation A under the Act, the
firm acted together with co-underwriters and sold 30,000 shares at $2 per share." Id. at 403.
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meaning of section 1 1 .9 Reflecting on the inadequacies of the underwriter's
investigation, the Commission felt that it was "appropriate to comment on the
importance which [the Commissioners] attach to the duties of the underwriter
in this respect,"ro and reaffirmed its holding in an earlier case "that an under-
writer willfully violates [section 11 and 12] if a prospectus used in the sale of
securities contains fraudulent representations and he failed to exercise rea-
sonable care to satisfy himself as to the accuracy of the prospectus.'*'
Two recent decisions which dealt with underwriters' liability under section
11 also involved the due diligence defense. In one, Feit v. Leasco Data Process-
ing Equipment Corp.,92 the court upheld the defense while in the other, Escott
v. BarChris Construction Corp.,93 it was rejected. Leasco was a class action
brought by a shareholder of Reliance Insurance Company seeking damages
resulting from misrepresentations and omissions in a registration statement
used in an offering of Leasco Data Processing Corporation stock. The Leasco
stock was used in conjunction with a tender offer to exchange plaintiff's Reliance
stock for that of defendant LeascoP 4
The plaintiff named as defendants Leasco, as issuer under the registration
statement, its principal officers and two dealer-managers.P 5 The chief allegation
was that the registration statement failed to dearly reveal that Reliance had
a surplus of approximately one hundred million dollars over and above that
required of insurance companies by state law (surplus surplus) which Leasco,
as a parent holding company, intended to use for its own purposes after the
takeover." The dealer-managers played a somewhat limited role in the prep-
aration of the registration statement. 7 They relied primarily on the issuer to
"produce relevant material from its files rather than [personally inquiring]
into corporate developments such as negotiations between target and acquiring
89. Id. at 405.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 405-06 (footnote omitted). The Commission referred to its holding in In re
Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33 (1953). Id. at 406.
92. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
93. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.I).N.Y. 1968).
94. 332 F. Supp. at 549-50. The plaintiff was a former shareholder of Reliance who ex-
changed his shares for those of Leasco. Id. at 550.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 549. Surplus surplus is the liquid assets held by an insurance company over and
above the surplus which the company is required by state law to maintain. The required
surplus can only be used within the insurance business of the company, while the company
is free to use the surplus surplus in any manner it chooses. The problem is that insurance
companies are generally not allowed to engage in nonisurance business. However, this
restriction may be circumvented if the insurance company can siphon off the surplus surplus
to a parent holding company. In this case, Leasco sought to be that holding company and
thereby gain the use of the surplus surplus. Id. at 550-51.
97. Id. at 561. In this transaction the investment banker's function was simply to man-
age the exchange of stock between Reliance and Leasco, as opposed to purchasing the Leasco
shares and then marketing them to the investing public. Id. at 561-62.
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companies."98s The dealer-managers were aware of the surplus surplus but felt
it should not be included in the registration statement because of Reliance's
refusal to cooperate in the registration process. The dealer-managers reasoned
that, absent the cooperation of Reliance, the surplus "should not be estimated"
and therefore should not be included in the registration statement. 9
The investigation carried on by the dealer-managers consisted of a thorough
review of all available financial data, an independent audit of Leasco, the
study of an actuarial report on Reliance, and detailed inquiries directed to
Leasco's major bank.100 The dealer-managers were also particularly careful in
their inquiries of Leasco concerning surplus surplus, and had a justified belief
that the lack of cooperation by Reliance would prevent them from getting the
information required to accurately estimate it.10 ' In this investigation, counsel
for the dealer-managers studied the corporate minutes, records and major
agreements of Leasco.
The court felt that the dealer-managers were aware of a contract between
the Reliance management and Leasco 10 2 whereby the former were guaranteed
tenure in their positions for five years and large bonuses in return for their
support of Leasco's tender offer.' 03 In discussing the liability of Leasco's direc-
tors, the court stated that they could only reach one conclusion-that Reliance's
management would have cooperated in the estimation of surplus surplus if it
had been asked.' 04 The failure of the directors to inquire as to surplus surplus
was grounds for their liability.'05 This could have been a source of liability
for the dealer-managers as well, but they were "in continuous contact with
Leasco ... and [were] apparently never disabused of the notion that [Reliance's
management] remained recalcitrant. This view was conclusively buttressed ... ,10
by receipt of a letter six days before the effective date of the registration state-
ment which reaffirmed the dealer-managers' belief that no cooperation would
be forthcoming. 07 Based on this, the court concluded that the dealer-managers
had exercised due diligence, noting that "[t]hough the finding might have gone
98. Id. at 562.
99. Id. at 561-62. In speaking of the dealer-managers, the court stated that they were
"at no time disabused of the notion that Reliance would not provide data to assist In an
approximation of surplus surplus. Since, based on [the dealer-managers'] own experience,
[they] had high regard for the competence of both Leasco's representatives and Its law firm,
there was no reason for him to suspect they would be withholding relevant information." Id.
at 561.
100. Id. at 582.
101. Id. at 582-83. The dealer-managers were aware of the importance of surplus surplus
in the transaction but felt that it "could not be computed accurately because there was no
factual basis for such a computation in the absence of access to Reliance's management ....
Id. at 561.
102. Id. at 583.
103. Id. at 556-57.
104. Id. at 579.
105. Id. at 580.
106. Id. at 583.
107. Id.
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the other way, on balance we conclude that the dealer-managers conducted a
reasonable investigation . *..."108
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,10 9 was a class action brought by
buyers of debentures in which the plaintiffs alleged that the registration state-
ment filed in connection with the debentures "contained material false state-
ments and material omissions."1 10 BarChris, as issuer and signer of the
registration statement, eight investment banking firms which had acted as
underwriters, and the accounting firm that had audited BarChris were named
as defendants. The misstatements and omissions were numerous and con-
cerned, inter alia, earnings, current assets, contingent liabilities, backlog of
orders, officers' loans, customer delinquencies, use of the proceeds of the offering
and corporate operations."' "The underwriters other than Drexel made no
investigation of the accuracy of the prospectus .. .They all relied upon
Drexel as the (lead) underwriter.""12 Drexel conducted a preliminary investiga-
tion to decide whether or not it would undertake the financing. This consisted
of familiarizing itself with the general industry and gathering information
about BarChris by reading a former stock prospectus and inquiring about
BarChris in certain banks with whom BarChris had dealt. 13 After the "letter
of intent" was delivered, Drexel obtained a Dun & Bradstreet report on BarChris,
read BarChris' annual report and participated in extensive discussions with
BarChris' management, in which pertinent questions were asked as to the
truth of statements made in the prospectus.1 4
Up to this point, the investigation was conducted by a partner of the
underwriter and a partner in the law firm representing the underwriter. There-
after, the bulk of the investigation, which consisted of searching the corporate
.minutes for the five preceding years and examining the major contracts of the
issuer, was carried on by what the court characterized as "a very junior associ-
108. Id. The court's conclusion is somewhat confusing. In reviewing the dealer-managers'
actions, the court stressed that on Aug. 13, 1968, just six days before the effective date of the
registration statement, they received further confirmation of Reliance's refusal to cooperate.
Id. at 562. Yet in reaching its conclusion the court stated: "The dealer-managers were,
however, undoubtedly aware of the August 1st contract between the Reliance management
and Leasco and absent any further verification, their failure to recognize the implications
of this agreement might well create liability ... ." Id. at 583. The contract referred to in
essence allowed Reliance's management to stay in control of the insurance company and
provided for bonuses in excess of $435,000 for Reliance's president in exchange for manage-
ment's cooperation in the tender offer. If the broker-managers actually knew of this agree-
ment it is difficult to conceive how they could still believe Leasco's claim that they could
not get facts concerning surplus surplus.
109. 283 F. Supp. 643 "(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
110. Id. at 652.
111. Id. at 656-80.
112. Id. at 692. This was standard procedure in an underwriting transaction. See Whitney,
Underwriters' Counsel-Advice to Mly Client: "That Which is Impossible Must Go Awayl,"
Symposium--"YThe BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability," 24 Bus. Law. 585, 585-86 (1969).
113. 283 F. Supp. at 693.
114. Id. at 693-95.
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ate" of the underwriter's counsel.115 Some of the principal omissions and mis-
statements in the registration statement arose out of areas concerning major
contracts and corporate minutes.'1 " Although certain corporate minutes were
known to be missing, the underwriter simply relied on information supplied
by BarChris. The court stressed that if the underwriters had read certain
major contracts they would have been better able to appreciate the serious
effects thereof on BarChris' financing.117 In holding the underwriters liable,
the court stated that "[ijn order to make the underwriters' participation in
this enterprise of any value to the investors, the underwriters must make some
reasonable attempts to verify the data submitted to them. They may not rely
solely on the company's officers or on the company's counsel. A prudent man
in the management of his own property would not rely on them."' 1 8
B. Comparison of Feit v. Leasco and BarChris
The investigations conducted by the underwriters in Leasco and BarChris
were somewhat similar. In both cases the misrepresentations and omissions arose
out of material in the registration statements which was supplied by the
issuer. What distinguishes BarChris from Leasco is the court's treatment of
the justification proffered by the respective underwriters for their reliance upon
the information supplied by the issuer without further independent verifica-
tion. The Leasco court stressed the fact that the broker-managers were aware
of the agreement between Leasco and Reliance's officers reached nineteen days
before the registration statement was to become effective." 9 The court also
noted, however, that they had received information to the effect that Reliance
had still refused to cooperate in supplying information necessary for an accurate
estimate of surplus surplus as late as six days before the effective date. All
though it would seem reasonable to attempt to clarify this apparent contra-
diction,1 20 the court did find some justification for the broker-managers' reli-
ance.'" On the other hand, the lead underwriter in BarChris was aware of the
fact that corporate minutes were missing and that some of the issuer's opera-
115. Id. at 694 n.23.
116. Id. at 695.
117. Id. at 594-95.
118. Id. at 697.
119. 332 F. Supp. at 583.
120. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
121. The court noted that the underwriter was completely familiar with the surplus
surplus concept and had been very concerned over the problem of estimating it. 332 F.
Supp. at 561-62, 582-83. It was also noted that the dealer-managers' counsel, a former
member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, conducted a thorough investigation of
the issuer. Id. at 562, 582-83. A reading of the court's view of the investigation conducted
by the dealer-managers would lead one to conclude that it was, overall, a conscientious and
professional one, conducted with sufficient vigor. Therefore, while the court felt that the
dealer-managers were aware of an agreement between Leasco and Reliance, it still felt
that they could not obtain Reliance's cooperation in estimating surplus surplus. Id.
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tions were experiencing problems. Nonetheless, it accepted the issuer's figures
without attempting to independently verify them - -
A further distinction in the justification of this reliance was found in the
experience of the parties who exercised their judgment by relying on the
issuer. In Leasco the court stressed the knowledge and experience of the indi-
viduals assigned to carry out the investigation by the broker-managers and their
counsel;' 23 whereas in BarChris the court stressed the relative inexperience of
certain of the individuals who conducted the investigation.' 4
Perhaps the two most important factors the courts relied on in determining
whether or not due diligence had been exercised were first, the role the under-
writer played in terms of leadership and control of the registration process,
and second, in view of the issuer's financial status, the degree of reliance which
would be placed on his statements by a reasonable man in the management of
his own property. In BarChris, due to the inexperience of the issuer's manage-
ment, the underwriter assumed a role of leadership in the transaction, at
various points directing the management to take certain steps regarding the
registration statement.'2 5 The financial position of the issuer was also an im-
portant factor.126 BarChris was, prior to the registration process, riding the
crest of a wave in a new and flourishing industry-the construction of bowling
centers after the introduction of the automatic pin setting machine. During
the registration process, however, there were indications that the tide had
begun to change for the industry and facts subsequent to the filing of the regis-
tration statement revealed that BarChris defaulted on the debentures and
filed a petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.'27
In Leasco, on the other hand, the underwriters played no role in preparing
the registration statement, having simply acted as dealer-managers of an issue
122. 283 F. Supp. at 697. The court stressed the role of the underwriter in the transaction,
stating that "the positions of the underwriter and the company's officers are adverse. It is
not unlikely that statements made by company officers to an underwriter to induce him to
underwrite may be self-serving. They may be unduly enthusiastic. As in this case, they may,
on occasion, be deliberately false." Id. at 696-97; see Folk (pt. 1) 54-56; Comment, Bar-
Chris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1411, 1420-22 (1968).
123. 332 F. Supp. at 582; see note 121 supra.
124. 283 F. Supp. at 695. The court clearly rejected the notion that underwriters exercise
due diligence by merely questioning the issuer and accepting his answers without inde-
pendently seeking to verify them. Id. at 696-97.
125. Id. at 693-95. In BarChris the underwriters were dealing with a relatively new
corporation. This was BarChris' second public offering, having come out with an offering of
common stock two years before. Id. at 654. The court also noted that there were extensive
discussions between the issuer, the accountants and the lead underwriter at which "successive
proofs of the prospectus were considered and revised." Id. at 693.
126. BarChris' position was also indicated by the fact that the issue had been rated as
speculative by an investment service. Id. at 681.
127. Id. at 652-54. A Chapter XI petition is filed to work out an arrangement with
creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970).
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which was to be used in conjunction with a takeover by exchange of stock.128
Moreover, the participants, Leasco and Reliance, were at the time well re-
spected members of the financial community. This was not an attempt to paint
a rosy picture of a speculative industry to help sell the issue, but rather an
attempt by the respective managements of Leasco and Reliance to benefit them-
selves at the expense of Reliance shareholders by not disclosing the true value of
Reliance. 29
C. Due Diligence and Participating Underwriters
The problem of determining the meaning of due diligence with regard to the
participating underwriter is even more complex. In BarChris, the court held
that since the participating underwriters did nothing and relied on the repre-
sentative, they would be bound by his failure to exercise due diligence.1 30 The
court, however, declined to decide whether they would have been protected
had a reasonable investigation on the part of the representative been estab-
lished.131
The question arises, then, as to what type of investigation is required by the
participating underwriter to satisfy the due diligence test. May he simply rely
on the information given to him in the "red herring" prospectus or must he,
like the lead underwriter, make some reasonable attempt at verification? The
latter alternative would create serious problems from a business point of view.
One commentator has postulated the following problem:
Think of the plight of the non-managing underwriters of COMSAT, where a public
offering of 1,000,000 shares in 1964 was participated in by nearly 400 underwriters,
scattered throughout the country. As you know, that was a new enterprise, with little
financial history. However, if each of the underwriters had deemed it essential to make
an independent investigation of all aspects of the registration statement, COMSAT'S
activities would have been seriously disrupted.182
In addition, the cost of an investigation by each individual underwriter would
be prohibitive.1a3
However, BarChris did not hold that participating underwriters can no
longer effectively delegate their duties of reasonable investigation to the repre-
sentative and be protected if he makes such an investigation. The question re-
128. 332 F. Supp. at 561. "The dealer-managers . . . played a somewhat limited role In
the exchange offer. Leasco's attorneys accepted primary responsibility for preparation of the
registration statement with the brokerage houses performing only the 'due diligence'
function." Id.
129. Id. at 554-61.
130. 283 F. Supp. at 697.
131. Id. n.26. There is near unanimity among commentators that satisfaction of the duo
diligence requirement by the lead underwriter ought to protect the participating under-
writers. See, e.g., Folk (pt. 1) 139; Comment, BarChris: Easing the Burden of "Duo
Diligence" Under Section 11, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 735, 745 (1969).
132. Comments of A. Throop in Symposium---'The BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability,"
24 Bus. Law. 624, 625 (1969).
133. See text accompanying note 192 infra.
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mains, therefore, what does section 11 require of the participating underwriter
in order for him to satisfy the due diligence standard? Congress recognized
that "[t]he duty of care to discover varies in its demand upon participants in
security distribution with the importance of their place in the scheme of dis-
tribution and with the degree of protection that the public has the right to
expect."113 4 In 1933 the Chairman of the F.T.C., originally responsible for the
enforcement of the Securities Act of 1933 and one of the principal draftsmen
of that Act, specifically recognized the differing position between lead and par-
ticipating underwriters and felt that participating underwriters should be
subject to a less stringent standard of due diligence.'3
In view of the foregoing, it would seem unreasonable to hold participating
underwriters to the same standards as those required of the representative. Yet
the nature of the underwriting agreement is such that the underwriters must
maintain the fiction that they participate individually, rather than jointly as
a group. This is dictated by regulation1 38 and by the financial judgment of the
investment banking community that participants in public offerings of secur-
ities cannot be individually exposed to liability for the entire offering. While
the concept of severalty is not applicable to the actual investigation carried on
by the parties, it is questionable whether the aims of the statute would be
furthered by the needless duplication of such investigations. 3 7 Mr. justice
Douglas, when still a professor at the Yale Law School, stated that "[e] conomy
is achieved by delegating to the originating house the function of investiga-
tion, not of the exercise of judgment upon the facts investigated. If it was the
design of Congress to assure accuracy and completeness in the registration
statement by multiplying the number of investigations, it lost sight not only
of this but of other costs entailed." 133 In its interpretation of the due diligence
required of outside as opposed to inside directors, the Leasco court recognized
that one's duties to reasonably investigate varies with one's relation to the
underwriting.139 Although it would be in accordance with the legislative in-
tent behind the Securities Act of 1933 to do the same with underwriters, this
has not been done.
Despite the fact that the purpose of the Act is not served by imposing
similar investigatory burdens on both lead and participating underwriters, this
result may be mandated by a section originally designed to give relief to the
underwriter, section 11(e).140 This section limits an underwriter's liability to
134. H.R Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
135. Landis, Liability Sections of the Securities Act, 18 Am. Accountant 330, 332 (1933).
136. 17 C.F.R. § 230.15c-1 (1971).
137. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171, 200 (1933).
138. Id. at 202 (footnote omitted).
139. "%Vhat constitutes 'reasonable investigation' and a 'reasonable ground to believe'
will vary with the degree of involvement of the individual, his expertise, and his access to
the pertinent information and data. What is reasonable for one director may not be
reasonable for another by virtue of their differing positions." Felt v. Leaso Data Processing
Equip. Corp. 332 F. Supp. 544, 577-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); see Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp, 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
140. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
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the total price of securities underwritten by him. Thus, in a situation where the
participating underwriters had been found to have exercised due diligence and
the lead underwriter had not, a finding of liability against the lead underwriter
would cover only a portion of the potential damages. Since the statute was
designed to be preventative rather than remedial, 141 it could thus allow a situ-
ation where defrauded investors could not recover lost funds,142 Furthermore,
it is clear from reading section 11 that Congress made no attempt to dis-
tinguish between lead and participating underwriters and imposed equal
standards of liability on both. 43
One of the most common answers to the problem has been to allow the par-
ticipating underwriter to delegate his duty to investigate to the lead, thereby
fulfilling the former's obligation if the delegate carries out a reasonable in-
vestigation.'4 The delegation of authority by the participating underwriter
is a reflection of the actual business practices in effect today. The only question
is whether or not the delegation of the duty to investigate satisfies the duediligence requirements of section 11 for participating underwriters. It is clear
under BarChris that the participating underwriter will not be protected when
he delegates his duties to a lead underwriter who in turn fails to exercise due
diligence.145
The court in BarChris noted that in view of its decision to hold the lead
underwriter liable, it became "unnecessary to decide whether the underwriters
other than [the lead] would have been protected if [the lead] had established
that as lead underwriter, it made a reasonable investigation.' 140 The court in
Leasco did not specifically treat this problem, but the investigation was con-
ducted by only one of the two dealer-managers, and the court upheld the due
141. Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
142. One commentator has stated that the section 11(e) limitation on liability "Implies
that the underwriters of a public offering should stand or fall together in their attempts to
satisfy due diligence." Comment, The Expanding Liability of Securities Underwriters: From
BarChris to Globus, 1969 Duke LJ. 1191, 1208 (footnote omitted); see Douglas & Bates,
Some Effects of the Securities Act Upon Investment Banking, 1 U. Chi, L. Rev. 283, 289-92
(1933).
143. Section 11(b)(3) only distinguishes between experts and non-experts. The section
does not allow non-experts to rely on facts provided by fellow non-experts. Securities Act
of 1933 § 1.b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1970).
144. See, e.g., Folk (pt. 1) 58; Comment, The Expanding Liability of Securities Under-
writers: From BarChris to Globus, 1969 Duke LJ. 1191, 1209-16; Comment, BarChris:
Easing The Burden Of "Due Diligence" Under Section 11, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 735t, 744-46
(1969).
145. 283 F. Supp. at 697; Comment, The Expanding Liability of Securities Underwriters:
From BarChris to Globus, 1969 Duke L.J. 1191, 1214-15. The same reasons that would
mitigate against adopting a separate standard of due diligence for participating underwrlters
also work against delegation as a defense when the lead underwriter has not exercised due
diligence.
146. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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diligence defense as to both.1 47 Therefore, one can presume that participating
underwriters will be protected if the lead underwriter conducts a reasonable
investigation.
V. INDEMNIFICATION OP UNDERWIUTMIS
One aspect of the traditional underwriting transaction which in the past
tended to mitigate the underwriters' liability is an indemnification agreement
with the issuer. It is standard procedure to include an indemnity clause in an
underwriting contract. 48 Such a clause provides that the issuer will indemnify
the underwriter against liability for false or misleading information provided
by the issuer in the registration statement. In cases where such information is
supplied by the underwriters, they likewise agree to indemnify the issuer.
1 49
The agreement among underwriters may also contain a provision in which the
underwriters agree to indemnify each other in terms similar to those con-
tained in the underwriting contract.lr °
In addition to these indemnification agreements, the underwriters may also
attempt to secure insurance with the issuer paying the premium in many
cases. The problem with insurance is that it is not easy to get and, even if avail-
able, is very expensive.' 9 ' Although individual policies vary, there are two
general types: blanket policies, usually covering a period of a year, and spe-
cific issue policies. Blanket policies are extremely difficult to obtain 9 2 and can
present the same problems as indemnification agreements"53 because insurers
insist that the underwriting contract contain an indemnification provision be-
tween the insurer and the underwriter, and that in case of liability, the rights of
the underwriter will be subject to subrogation by the insurer.154
147. 332 F. Supp. at 583. The court noted that the broker-managers were not in the same
position regarding the transaction. Id. at 561.
148. When Corporations Go Public 83-84.
149. Robinson & Eppler § 49, at 201-02. For examples of typical indemnity dauSes see
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287 n.14 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
913 (1970); Robinson & Eppler § 52, at 215-17; When Corporations Go Public 285-88.
150. For a sample clause in an agreement among underwriters see Robinson & Eppler,
§ 36, at 156.
151. Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance
in the Light of BarChris and Globus, Symposium--"The BarChris Case: Prospectus
Liability," 24 Bus. Law. 681 (1969).
152. Id. at 685. This type of policy is usually purchased by the underwriter and therefore
is not an attempt to shift the burden of a securities act violation as would be a policy where
the premiums were paid for by the issuer. "There are only 20 or 25 of these blanket policies
in existence ... and it is almost impossible to get new ones today. Nevertheless some of the
leading underwriting houses have them." Applebaum & McDowell, Indemnification Against
Securities Acts Liabilities, Symposium-Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Lia-
bilities, 27 Bus. Law. 131, 137 (Special Issue 1972).
153. See notes 159-66 infra and accompanying text.
154. Id. In light of the questionable validity of indemnification agreements the protec-
tion thus afforded to the issuer could be meaningless. This fact would obviously affect the
cost and availability of such policies, making it even more difficult for the underwriter to
protect himself. See Applebaum & McDowell, supra note 152, at 137.
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The second type of policy is designed to cover a specific issue; in larger
transactions the coverage is generally limited to one half of the offering.105
Based on figures stated in January, 1969, "the premiums for a $5 million
policy apparently would fall in the $25,000-$35,000 range. It is believed that
the largest specific-issue policy ever written was $107 million for the General
Aniline offering a few years ago at a premium cost of about $355,000."160
Today, the cost of premiums has nearly doubled.15 7 While it was not difficult
to obtain a policy in the late sixties, today insurance "is simply no longer ob-
tainable in many cases when the underwriters would like to have it. You can
still get the insurance on a 'blue chip' issue where probably you do not need it.
But it is very difficult to get on a new 'over the counter' stock that has not
gone public before."15l s
The protection afforded by indemnification agreements and issuer paid in-
surance coverage has been cast into doubt by recent developments.1 0 Criticism
of these practices has been twofold. The first basis for such criticism is that
holding an underwriter harmless for his violations of section 11 defeats one
of the basic purposes of the Act-to insure that all parties make a thorough
investigation of the contents of the registration statement. This makes the
underwriter's role as devil's advocate a mere fiction. Professor Loss has stated
that indemnification could be interpreted as a waiver of compliance in viola-
tion of section 14 and also contrary to "the in terrorem effect intended for
§11 . . . to promote careful adherence to the statutory requirements.1 100
The second argument against indemnification and issuer paid insurance is
that the purpose of section 11(f) is defeated when the underwriters force the
issuer to shoulder the entire burden of damages.10 1 Section 11(f) provides that
where "one or more of the persons . . . shall be jointly and severally li-
able . . . every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this
section may recover contribution as in cases of contract .... 110
155. Kroll, supra note 151, at 687.
156. Id.
157. Applebaum & McDowell, supra note 152, at 137. "[Wlhile two years ago you could
buy $1,000,000 worth of coverage for a premium which ranged roughly from $24,000 to
$34,000, today you are talking about something in excess of a $50,000 premium for this
much insurance." Id.
158. Id.
159. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970). See also Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1952),
where the court refused to enforce an underwriting contract as contrary to public policy and
violative of the Securities Act of 1933.
160. 3 Loss 1831; Comment, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 72 Yale L.J. 406, 408 (1962).
161. 3 Loss 1831.
162. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970); see Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971).
This suit was brought by an underwriter to require contribution from other defendants after
it had satisfied a judgment. While the judgment was not based on section 11, the court still
felt that the underwriter had the right of contribution. Id. at 958.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission had expressed its views on the
indemnification by the issuer of directors, officers and controlling persons.
Rule 460163 states that such an agreement "is against public policy as ex-
pressed in the act and is, therefore, unenforceable"'u If the issue is subject
to an indemnification agreement, the Commission requires a clause in the regis-
tration statement or prospectus expressing its views on this subject. 0 5 The
Commission further requires that where a director, officer or controlling person
brings a claim to enforce the indemnification agreement, the issuer will "submit
to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question whether such indemnifica-
tion by it is against public policy as expressed in the act... 2110
The Commission has not attempted to regulate the indemnification of under-
writers, even though underwriters' statutory duties under section 11 are the
same as those of officers, directors and controlling persons. Professor Loss
feels that this is because the Commission feared underwriters would be un-
willing to assume the risk of liability under section 11, and would thereby hurt
an essential part of the economy--corporate financing.107
The first major litigation involving an indemnification agreement between
an issuer and an underwriter was Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.os
Plaintiffs, purchasers of Law Research Service stock, brought an action based
on section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 193310 and section 10(b) of the
163. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 n.(a) (1971).
164. Id. Rule 460 only requires the issuer to include in a registration statement the fact
that there is an indemnification agreement with the underwriter. Id. at n.(b). This rule
expresses what is commonly referred to as the "Johnson & Johnson Formula" because it
was first applied on an informal basis to a registration filed by that company in 1944. Kroll,
supra note 151, at 689.
165. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 n.(a) "(1971); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9,
1968), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 3806, at 3327-6. In speaking of indemnification of
directors, officers, or controlling persons, the Release provides that if the registration state-
ment does not contain a statement of the SEC's policy on indemnification of those parties
for liabilities arising under the 1933 Act, its views should be included in the prospectus. Re-
garding underwriters, the Release provides that "[ijf the underwriting agreement provides
for indemnification by the registrant of the underwriters or their controlling persons against
liabilities arising under the Act, a brief description of such indemnification provisions may
be furnished in the body of the prospectus . .. " Id. The Commission does not require any
statement about insurance against liability arising under the Act, regardless of who pays the
premiums. Id.
166. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 n.(a) (1970). Absent such a commitment, the Commison
will not grant acceleration. Id. The Securities and Exchange Commission intervened in Lcasco
and filed a brief stating that it felt it was against public policy to indemnify inside directors
when they failed to exercise due diligence. 167 N.Y..J. far. 28, 1972, at 4, coL 2.
167. 3 Loss 1835; see Comment, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 72 Yale L.J. 406, 407 (1962).
168. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
169. Section 17(a) is the general anti-fraud provision in the Securities Act of 1933. 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). The Act provides: "(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in
the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-(1)
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934.170 They alleged that the offering circular
prepared in connection with a Regulation A offering1 71 was misleading. Plain-
tiffs named the issuer, its officers and the underwriters as defendants, 172 Law
Research's plan was to computerize court opinions and sell this service to
lawyers. The corporation could not afford to purchase the hardware necessary
for this function so it entered into a contract with the Univac division of
Sperry Rand Corporation which provided that Law Research would supply
the legal data and Sperry Rand would furnish computer services. Shortly
after the system became operative, large debts to Sperry began to build up.
At the same time, Law Research's president began to explore the possibilities
of a public offering with Blair & Co., Granbery Marache, Inc., the defendant
underwriter. It was decided by Law Research and Blair that funds should be
raised by the sale of equity securities, the proceeds of which would be used to
pay off the debt and to finance the indexing of federal court opinions. 1 8
Prior to the effective date of the offering, a dispute arose with Sperry Rand
which resulted in the termination of computer services and the initiation of a
law suit by Law Research against Sperry Rand based on fraud and breach of
contract. 174 Plaintiff alleged that the circular was misleading in that it
prominently featured the relationship with Sperry Rand, yet failed to dis-
close Sperry Rand's termination of computer services and Law Research's
subsequent filing of the lawsuit.175 The trial by jury resulted in verdicts against
all three defendants and plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive
damages.176 On a cross-claim by Blair against the issuer and its officers based
upon an indemnification provision the jury found in favor of Blair. However,
the trial judge granted Law Research's motion to set aside the jury verdict for
indemnification, stating that
[i]f an underwriter were to be permitted to escape liability for its own misconduct by
obtaining indemnity from the issuers, it would have less of an incentive to conduct a
to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property by
means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
170. Id. § 78j(b) (1970).
171. Regulation A permits issuers of small public offerings (less than $500,000) to dis-
pese with the filing of detailed and lengthy full registration statements. The offerer simply
submits an offering circular to the Commission instead. [current vol.] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1. 78,485 (Jan. 7, 1972).
172. 418 F.2d at 1278.
173. Id. at 1280-81.
174. Id. at 1281. Law Research's president did not think it was deterimental to be
deprived of the use of Sperry Rand's computers because the tapes containing the judicial
decisions could be used on any Univac computer. Id. n.5. Law Research let the suit lapse by
not filing a complaint. Id. at 1281.
175. Id. at 1279.
176. Id.
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thorough investigation and to be truthful in the prospectus distributed under its name,
than it would be if the indemnity was enforceable under such circumstances. 1"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
award of punitive damages but otherwise affirmed the district cour 178 The
court noted that awarding punitive and compensatory damages tended to
show, in the light of the trial judge's charge, that the jury found that Blair
had actual knowledge of the material misstatements. In light of this, it felt
that to enforce the indemnification clause would be against the purposes and
policies of the Securities Act of 1933. The decision in Globs vras limited, how-
ever: "[I]t is important to emphasize at the outset that at this time we con-
sider only the case where the underwriter has committed a sin graver than
ordinary negligence."' 179 In support of its conclusion, the court cited Rule 460,
which announced the Commission's opinion that indemnification of directors,
officers and controlling persons for liabilities arising under the 1933 Act vas
contrary to the purpose of the Act. The court felt that to make this a consistent
policy "underwriters should be treated equally with controlling persons and
hence be prohibited from obtaining indemnity from the issuer."180 The court
also noted that although the underwriter receives indemnity from the issuer,
the money actually comes from the shareholders who, in many cases, are the
people to whom the underwriter will be found liable.1 8' It was indicated that
indemnity may violate section 14 of the 1933 Acts- which prohibits agreements
in which the buyers of securities exempt their sellers from liability under the
Actml s The court distinguished cases upholding indemnity in other fields noting
that "the Securities Act is more concerned with prevention than cure.2"8
Although the Globus holding was limited to cases where underwriters have
actual knowledge of misstatements and exhibit a wanton indifference towards
their obligations, 85 some commentators have stated that this is merely the
177. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 "(S .Y. 1968), aff'd,
418 F2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 913 (1970).
178. 418 F.ad at 1292.
179. Id. at 1288.
180. Id. (citations omitted). One article has noted two differences between directors and
underwriters: "One is that, while the underwriter purchases the securities in a typical
underwriting and resells them, he really is providing a service to an issuer, and therefore
perhaps is more justified in his attempts to minimize his exposure. Secondly, he has an
advantage that the director does not have, namely, he does not have to go forward with this
game if it is not being played by rules that are comfortable for him." Applebaum & Me-
Dowell, supra note 152, at 132.
181. 418 F.2d at 1289.
182. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 US.C. § 77n (1970).
183. Section 14 provides: "Any condition, stipuation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the
rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id.
184. 418 F.2d at 1289.
185. "Thus it is important to emphasize at the outset that at this time we consider only
the case where the underwriter has committed a sin graver than ordinary negligence." Id. at
1288.
1972]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
first step toward voiding indemnity in cases of ordinary negligence. 180 The
reasoning of Globus would apply equally to both because section 11 does not
distinguish between intentional and negligent misrepresentations or omis-
sions, and an underwriter's negligent investigation could not be considered
reasonable action for a prudent man in the management of his own property.
Although the application of the reasoning in Globus has been criticized,18 7 the
reasoning itself is valid. It is clear that the policies of the 1933 Act requiring
full disclosure and the development of an adversary relationship between the
underwriter and the issuer would be defeated by upholding an indemnification
agreement in cases where the indemnitee has willfully violated the Act.
Due to his lack of personal contact with the issuer, it would be difficult
to envision a situation where a participating underwriter had actual knowledge
of misrepresentation or omissions, but if such were the case, one would pre-
sume that he would not be allowed to enforce his indemnification agreement. 188
A far more likely situation is one where the lead underwriter would not be
able to enforce his indemnity provisions under Globus and yet, under the same
test, the participating underwriter would be able to do so. This would be a
reasonable solution in the sense that the participating underwriter would be
afforded some protection from liability caused by the willful violations of
section 11 by those participants he is not in a position to control. 180 The real
problem here lies in the fact that the Globus reasoning supports the position
that mere negligence should also void an indemnity agreement. Rule 460 does
not differentiate between indemnity for intentional or negligent acts, nor does
the agreement forbidden by section 14. Furthermore, whether the failure to
186. E.g., Kroll, supra note 151, at 692; Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 951, 958 (1969); cf.
State Mutual Life Ass'n Co. of America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
187. "On its facts, Globus is a black case. It is bard to swallow the notion that, for the
price of the underwriting compensation available in an offering of $300,000 or less, an
underwriter would engage in the conduct which Judge Mansfield and the jury found should
be characterized as 'involving actual knowledge of false and misleading statements or
omissions and wanton indifference to its obligations and the rights of others .... ' But swallow
it we must, and on that record the denial of indemnification rights can be agreed to. So,
Globus is not 'impossible to live with.' It should not frighten our underwriter clients
although it may well turn their stomachs." Whitney, Underwriters' Counsel-Advlce to My
Client: "That Which is Impossible Must Go Away I", Symposium-"The BarChris Case:
Prospectus Liability," 24 Bus. Law. 585, 590 (1969).
188. In Globus, the court stressed that there was actual knowledge of misrepresentations.
Recalling that the participating underwriter's investigation is limited to an examination of
the "red herring" prospectus and attendance at a due diligence meeting, it is unlikely that
he would discover any misrepresentations or omissions. It should be noted that the
Commission regularly reviews "red herring" prospectuses-therefore, if one could detect
misrepresentations or omissions from reading it, it is very likely that the Commission would
reject the registration statement.
189. Yet allowing lead underwriters to escape liability for violations of section 11 caused
by their own negligence would be contrary to the purpose of that section. See notes 190-96
supra and accompanying text.
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disclose results from negligence or intentional conduct, there is equal harm
to the investing public.'90
Globus held that indemnity agreements should be questioned when they
"would have a tendency [to encourage underwriters] to be lax in their inde-
pendent investigations.' 91 This again raises the issue of distinguishing be-
tween lead and participating underwriters for purposes of due diligence. It is
submitted that the courts should judge each underwriter individually, keeping
in mind the fact that Congress seeks to view each participant in terms of the
role he plays in the transaction 9 2 and then determine, in view of his actions,
whether or not he should receive indemnity from the issuer. Thus, while it is
difficult to distinguish between underwriters for purposes of liability under
section 11, even though the traditional practices of the financial community
indicate that there is not equal culpability, the courts could rectify this in-
justice by selective voiding of indemnity agreements. This would accomplish
the purpose of the Act by encouraging the lead underwriter to verify the con-
tents of the registration statement, while protecting the participating under-
writers from vicarious liability. It would also give protection to the participating
underwriter without requiring an enormous increase in the cost of underwriting,
in all likelihood to be borne by the issuer and in turn the shareholder because
of the increase in the spread. Underwriters do not have the freedom to increase
the spread to the level they choose.'9 3 Therefore, it is quite possible that
because of the increased costs of investigation by a participating underwriter,
sound financial houses will be driven out of the underwriting community. 1 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The present day realities of underwriting, taken in conjunction with the
limitations on underwriter liability found in section 11(e),105 makes distin-
guishing between lead and participating underwriters difficult, if not impossible.
Assuming that the 1933 Act requires so many unnecessary and duplicative in-
vestigations so as to effectively prohibit profitable underwriting, the courts
must seek some way to soften the harshness of the potential liability imposed
on participating underwriters. As the system stands now, the public investor
will be the one who eventually pays. The cost of duplicative investigation will
190. No one can seriously dispute that the negligence in BarChris was just as damnaging
to the investing public as the willful violations found in Globus.
191. 418 F.2d at 1288.
192. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 "(1933), see text accompanying note 134
supra.
193. There are certain limits to underwriters' compensation. See Merrifield, Underwriting
Compensation, 26 Bus. Law. 1235 (1971). If it becomes impossible to underwrite issues
profitably because of the cost of the required investigation, this will drive responsible
bankers out of the area and leave it open to underwriters who will not investigate or wl
make sham investigations and so be able to render the transaction profitable.
194. In light of the present state of it's avaiaility to underwriters, insurance is at best
a questionable solution to section 11 liability. See generally notes 151-58 supra and
accompanying text.
195. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
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be passed on in the form of an increased spread on stocks, and the investor
will therefore get less actual value for his dollar. Alternatively, if no investiga-
tions are conducted individually by participating underwriters, the risk in-
volved will drive responsible investment bankers out of underwriting, thus
opening the industry to the type of participants that federal securities legisla-
tion sought to ban.
Section 11(f) provides that one can not require contribution if he is guilty
of fraudulent misrepresentation. 90 This prohibition should be expanded to
prevent the issuer or the lead underwriter from obtaining contribution from
participating underwriters where the former parties have not exercised due
diligence. The same result would be achieved without amending section 11 (f)
if the courts would adopt requirements for participating underwriters with due
consideration for "their place in the scheme of distribution" and employ
them in their decisions on the enforceability of indemnity provisions. 19 7 In
cases where there is no contractual right of indemnification benefiting the
participating underwriter, the courts should allow the participating underwriter
to seek common law indemnification against both the issuer and lead under-
writer if they were responsible for the section 11 violations. While these solu-
tions could make underwriters less desirous of managing the syndicate and
assuming a position of leadership, this could be rectified by demanding higher
management fees from participating underwriters or by billing each under-
writer for the expense of the investigation in proportion to his share of the
issue.
196. Id. § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) "(1970). That section provides that there shall be
no contribution where "the person who has become liable was, and the other was not,
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation."
197. Professor Loss recently stated, in connection with his position as Reporter for the
American Law Institute project attempting to codify federal securities legislation Into an
integrated Federal Securities Code, that he hoped "we shall say that the court, in consider-
ing the defense of reasonable care and reasonable investigation, shall appropriately distin-
guish between inside and outside directors, and among different kinds of officers, and
between orthodox, professional underwriters and purely technical underwriters," Ruder,
Wheat & Loss, Standards of Conduct under the Federal Securities Acts, Symposium-
Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, 27 Bus. Law. 75, 88 (Special Issue
1972). It should be noted that when the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a brief
opposing indemnification of Leasco directors by the corporation, it argued that indemnifica-
tion was against public policy only in the case of inside directors. 167 N.Y.LJ. Mar. 28,
1972, at 4, col. 2.
